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Connecting ecosystem services science and policy
in the field
JB Ruhl1*, James Salzman2,3, Craig Anthony Arnold4, Robin Craig5, Keith Hirokawa6, Lydia Olander7, Margaret Palmer8, and
Taylor H Ricketts9,10

Conservation and provision of ecosystem services (ES) have been adopted as high-level policy in many countries, yet there has
been surprisingly little application of these broad policies in the field; for example, ES are rarely considered in permit issuance or
other discrete agency actions. This large implementation gap arises in part because the science that drove general policy interest in
ES differs from the science needed for practical application. A better understanding of the environmental policy toolkit can guide
more effective research to support agency decisions. Here, we outline the framework used to teach environmental policy instruments through the “Five P’s”: prescription, property, penalty, payment, and persuasion. We then discuss the discrete ES research
required to effectively implement each tool. To support greater conservation of ES in the field, scientists and policy makers must
clearly recognize what each needs from the other.
Front Ecol Environ 2021; doi:10.1002/fee.2390

D

espite its influence on broad policy goals, ecosystem
services (ES) science has had little effect on governmental
decision making in the field. A mere two decades ago, “ecosystem services” was an obscure term in science and policy; for
example, in 1997, only six scholarly articles contained the term
“ecosystem services”. Interest in ES has exploded since then
(Costanza et al. 2017); in 2019, over 4000 research articles

In a nutshell:
• There is a persistent gap between high-level policies for
conservation and practical implementation of ecosystem
services (ES)
• Agencies rarely consider ES in permitting and other field-
level decisions
• There is a need for more research specifically designed
to support agency decisions
• Understanding the environmental policy toolkit –the “Five
P’s” –will guide more effective research design
• We show the specific research needs for each policy tool
that will drive conservation of ES in the field
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spanning fields from ecology and economics to hydrology, psychology, and human health included the term. Thanks in large
part to this intense research effort, numerous governance institutions have embraced conservation of ES as a broad policy goal
(Ruhl and Salzman 2007; Scarlett and Boyd 2015), but this goal
is mostly aspirational, as consideration of ES rarely influences
permitting and other day-to-day decisions carried out by government agencies (Salzman et al. 2014; Posner et al. 2016;
Sharon et al. 2018; Bell-James 2019; Kieslich and Salles 2021).
What explains this implementation gap? Why has there been
such success linking major scientific research to high-level policy
pronouncements about ES on the one hand, yet so little integration of ES in practical decision making? We argue that the
research that drove general policy interest in ES –where they
come from and how much they are worth –is not the same kind
of research needed to drive implementation on the ground.
Agency statements about the importance of ES are not self-
implementing. They take effect in the field through specific policy tools, such as permits or subsidies, and require more ES
research for widespread implementation (Bai et al. 2018; Chen
et al. 2019; Chan and Satterfield 2020).
On the basis of their study of the ES science–policy interface, Posner et al. (2016) argued that ES science will have
greater impact on policy if scientists better understand
decision-making processes. To that end, this article is directed
primarily toward scientists, with the goal of demonstrating
how their research can support specific policy tools like environmental permitting or urban planning. We explain the environmental law and policy toolkit, highlighting its applications
and the specific ES research questions demanded by each tool.

The ES implementation gap
The rapid expansion of ES research in the scientific community drove the rapid endorsement of ES conservation in
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the policy community (Ruhl and Salzman 2007). The 2005
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment spoke directly to the
policy community, assessing the state of the world’s ecosystems through the metric of service provision (MA 2005).
Governments took notice (Reid 2006) and have since launched
an international effort to inform decision making through
regular scientific assessments (IPBES 2019).
In the US, the Army Corps of Engineers and the
Environmental Protection Agency issued joint regulations in
2008 stating that they would consider the impacts to ES of
their decisions regarding wetland development permits
(USACE/EPA 2008); likewise, the US Forest Service (USFS)
adopted a regulation in 2012 on the importance of managing
ES in national forest management plans (USFS 2012). The EU
has adopted similar policies, such as the EU Commission’s
2013 green infrastructure policy, which incorporates ES provision as the primary goal (EC 2013).
The scientific community’s success in advancing ES at high
policy levels, however, has not translated down to the scale of
day-to-day practical implementation (Carpenter et al. 2009;
Olander et al. 2017). To be sure, political opposition, inadequate funding, institutional fragmentation, and agency inertia
have hindered implementation of robust ES protections
(Arnold 2007; Salzman et al. 2014; Scarlett and Boyd 2015).
However, the failure to move from policy adoption to effective
field-scale implementation is not the result of these obstacles
alone –the focus of scientific research plays a role as well.
Natural and social scientists must work together to shift from
establishing the general importance of ES provision to answering practical application questions, such as how to measure the
impact of a development on the flow of services to specific
beneficiaries, and how and where to compensate for losses
(Chan and Satterfield 2020).
This type of targeted science has been developed for “payment for environmental services” (PES) programs (Liu and Yang
2013; Zheng et al. 2013), but much less so to support decision
making in other contexts. For example, although EU
Commission staff have issued guidelines for implementing the
2013 green infrastructure policy (EC 2019), explicit implementation of ES goals and metrics in local urban plans and policies
has been slow (Cortinovis and Geneletti 2019). Similarly,
although the USFS’s 2012 planning rule adopts an ES framework, national forest plans issued since then contain almost no
mention of ES beyond those included in previous plans: timber,
water, and recreation (Ruhl and Salzman 2020). The same is true
for methods and metrics for measuring ES losses from wetlands
mitigation (Womble and Doyle 2012; Adusumilli 2015).
Scientists who can view the world from the same perspective as regulators and planners can better design relevant
research. Equally, policy actors can better articulate, and then
fund, the kind of scientific research that supports discrete decisions in the field (Posner et al. 2016). In short, those working in
the ES policy community need to think more like scientists,
and those working in the ES science community need to think
more like policy actors.
Front Ecol Environ doi:10.1002/fee.2390
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We contribute toward this mutual learning process by
explaining the basic toolkit used to implement environmental
protection in the field. We then demonstrate the type of
research, both natural and social science, to support use of
those tools.

An ES policy toolkit primer
Passing an environmental law or issuing a high-level policy
that promotes ES will not in itself improve the provision
of ES. To have an effect on the ground, an ES policy must
be translated into actionable law (such as statutes and agency
regulations) and then individually applied in discrete decisions (such as issuance of permits).
Although environmental law can be dauntingly complex,
the toolkit used to apply policy and law can be distilled to
just five instruments. Law schools typically teach the environmental policy toolkit through the mnemonic of the “Five
P’s”: prescription, property, penalty, payment, and persuasion
(Salzman 2013). Used individually or in combination, these
tools provide the regulatory capacity to protect and enhance
flows of ES to people –so long as the appropriate science is
available. The Five P’s are described individually in the following sections.

Prescription
Prescriptions either prohibit a specified action or mandate
requirements. Prescriptive regulations are the foundation of
most environmental law globally. Laws ban wide classes of
actions unless a governing authority has granted prior
approval through the issuance of a permit. For example,
state and local regulations frequently restrict development
in coastal dune areas to preserve flood control and other
ES.

Property
A classic solution to overconsumption of common resources
is to privatize the resource by creating property rights. Clear
and enforceable property rights can promote market forces
to encourage environmentally protective behavior. The property tools most common in the ES setting are mitigation
banking offsets, which permit land development in exchange
for purchasing a government-created property in the form
of tradable credits of restored habitat.

Penalty
Fines and liability rules require actors who cause harm to
property or resources to pay for the damage, restore the
damaged area, or both. For example, statutory regimes governing oil spills and contaminated lands can require responsible parties pay compensation for the lost and damaged
natural resources, including the loss of ES. Local regulators
can levy impact fees on development that will harm ES
resources.
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Payment
The flip side of penalties, payments (money or other incentives)
are provided by compensation programs to owners of natural
capital in exchange for preserving or improving flows of ES.
This is the core approach of PES programs, such as paying
farmers to fallow land for migratory bird habitat. Although
PES has dominated policy attention with regard to ES, it is
effective only under limited conditions (Salzman et al. 2018).

Persuasion
Persuasion programs rely on the generation and analysis of
information to guide behavior. For instance, the US National
Environmental Policy Act requires federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of proposed major actions
expected to have substantial adverse environmental consequences. Agencies can use these analyses to identify loss
and gain of ES from different alternative actions.

Summary
A number of important policy mechanisms combine these
tools. For example, habitat offset programs link prescription
and property: development of a species’ habitat is prohibited
unless the developer obtains a permit (prescription), and the
permit requires the developer to purchase an adequate number
of government-
created offset credits (property) for restored
habitat.
To visualize the Five P’s in action, consider the tools available for a government agency to protect an endangered bird
species. Prescriptive regulation might ban actions
that harm the birds or degrade their habitat without obtaining a permit. Property rights could be
used to create a trading program using breeding
pairs as the currency of exchange –landowners
who modified their habitat could mitigate their
actions by purchasing offset credits of habitat for
breeding pairs established elsewhere. Financial
penalties could be imposed on landowners who
make habitat less suitable to local endangered
species. Conversely, payments could be made to
landowners who improve habitat to make it more
suitable to breeding pairs. Likewise, regional
planners could use persuasion by mapping where
voluntary actions would most enhance the birds’
habitat.

social science research can reveal the community priorities,
resulting valuations, and distributional economic and cultural
effects (Salzman et al. 2014).
Implementing any of the Five P’s involves considerable risk,
because both ecological and social systems are highly dynamic
and unpredictable (Suding et al. 2016). While economists and
regulators typically acknowledge biophysical risk (for example,
it is often factored into the number of credits required to mitigate for wetland losses), calculations are rather ad hoc and not
well supported by science (Tallis et al. 2015; Zambello et al.
2019). Science is therefore also needed to inform these risk
calculations for application in the field. For instance, how does
the risk of failure vary as a function of the type of restoration
and management action, the biophysical context, and likely
changes in climate and land use (Palmer et al. 2014)? Even if
the biophysical outcome is as hoped for, how might social, cultural, and economic changes prevent the intended supply of ES
to the intended beneficiaries (Kapustka et al. 2016)? Research
questions like these cannot be answered by the science that
supported adoption of high-level ES policy goals. To help close
that gap, we present a range of resource management examples
below to illustrate how each policy tool dictates a particular
management strategy with information needs, and therefore
particular ES research questions.

Prescription
Under the US Clean Water Act, developments that affect
wetlands and streams must avoid, minimize, and then mitigate
ecological losses (Salzman and Ruhl 2000; Lave and Doyle

The research needs of the policy toolkit
With an understanding of the policy toolkit, we
can now consider the natural and social sciences
needed to incorporate ES meaningfully into
operational practices. Natural science researchers
can inform an urban planner how much a particular component of green infrastructure can
provide ES for a specific community, but only


Figure 1. Regulatory programs protect natural resources, such as this coastal marsh on a
popular barrier island adjacent to Bogue Sound in North Carolina, that provide ecosystem
services (ES) to local and distant populations. Decisions regarding avoidance, minimization,
and mitigation of impacts to ES depend on research that links source to beneficiary and
measures impacts at the appropriate scale.
Front Ecol Environ doi:10.1002/fee.2390
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2021). To implement that hierarchy with attention to ES provision, the regulator needs to know both the biophysical loss
of discrete services from filling a wetland and who is losing
the benefit of each service. For example, if the wetland filters
a drinking water supply, will the loss of 20 ha or 200 ha
require a downstream community to begin treating its water
supply to comply with drinking water standards (Figure 1)?
The vast majority of such regulatory decisions occur at the
margin (eg what the impacts of removing 25 ha, as opposed
to 15 ha, of forested land from an urban area might be). The
possibility of nonlinear threshold effects from the accumulation
of many field-level decisions makes research at this scale crucial
for decision makers (Garmestani 2014).
The metrics for measurement of loss and gain are particularly important. Although academic and agency researchers
have proposed many ES indicators (Czúcz et al. 2018; Ma et al.
2019), few are relevant to policy formulation (Mandle et al.
2021). For instance, hectares of wetland loss or water holding
capacity do not provide information about the impacts of the
development on specific human communities due to changes
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in provision of their water services –who will be affected and
by how much (Mandle et al. 2021). More useful are benefit-
relevant indicators, such as assessment of the impacts of
reduced sediment capture or water storage on water quality
and flood control, respectively, for downstream communities
(Watson et al. 2019; Mazzotta et al. 2019; Olander et al. 2018).
Social science research can build on these indicators to help
regulators understand how people value different ES and the
equity effects of ES resource depletion.
Taken together, indicators and valuation make clear the
costs and benefits of different development permit conditions,
showing how changes in ES will benefit or harm people and
informing field-scale decisions, such as whether to grant a permit or development conditions. More research is required
across a broad array of ES resources to identify indicators that
are credible scientifically, relatively easy to calculate using
existing information, relevant in different spatial and temporal
contexts, and widely acceptable to stakeholders (van
Oudenhoven et al. 2018). Research can also help incorporate
variability in the risk of reductions in or loss of ES into the
regulatory response concerning a particular ecosystem and
beneficiary community.

Property

Figure 2. Some regulatory programs allow mitigation requirements to be
satisfied by purchasing “credits” from a “banking” project that has
restored a similar resource. Calculating the required credits must account
for the risks that the restored resource, such as this streambank below a
waterfall on the Cumberland Plateau in Tennessee, will degrade due to
factors like climate change and nearby land uses.
Front Ecol Environ doi:10.1002/fee.2390

Under the US streambank mitigation offset program, entrepreneurs who have restored streambanks in the watershed
can certify “mitigation banks”, whereby the government grants
them property rights in the form of offset credits that can
then be sold to developers to offset the impacts of their projects on streams (Salzman and Ruhl 2000; Lave and Doyle
2021). In approving mitigation in offset programs like this,
the regulator should be in a position to determine (1) how
many credits the bank should be awarded when approved;
(2) the number of credits needed to mitigate for the resources
lost to a particular development; (3) whether the credits represent ES that are comparable in type and kind to those services lost; and (4) whether the communities losing services
are the same as those benefiting from the services that the
mitigation bank would provide. As noted above, each of those
determinations must also account for the risks associated with
biophysical and social change (Figure 2). For example, if riparian habitat is destroyed in one location and restored elsewhere,
who benefits from the new services, are they the same people
who lost the same or different services from the destroyed
habitats, and how certain are we that a mitigation credit project will successfully compensate for those losses?
To address these questions, the regulator must assess ES loss
at the development site as well as ES provided by the mitigation
site and have a means for comparing the two. This evaluation
will depend critically on the types of services lost and beneficiaries in each location (Womble and Doyle 2012). For
instance, when a wetland is destroyed, groundwater recharge
and carbon sequestration will likely be easier to mitigate
throughout a watershed, whereas flood protection or water
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purification will have impacts only directly downstream.
Without appropriate data, the regulator cannot determine
whether the offset fully replaces the lost services.
As with prescriptive tools like permits, the value assigned to
an offset credit (eg 100 linear stream meters or 30 ha of wetland) can require more than biophysical data. Fully accounting
for ES offsets requires information about the impact on the
flow of services to people and communities, and how much it
matters to them. Wetland mitigation in a remote area may mitigate ES for fewer people and provide far less value than the
same areal extent in a dense urban area (Ruhl and Salzman
2006; BenDor and Brozović 2007).

Penalties
Under programs such as the US Oil Pollution Act, financial
penalties are imposed on polluters under natural resources
damage laws for harm to coastal ecosystems and the cost
of restoration measures (EPA 2018). In assessing penalty
levels for lost ES provision, a regulator must first know the
types and magnitude of lost service flows and which community or communities each service flowed to. However,
much of the baseline information about ES flows is simply
nonexistent, making it difficult to assess actual damages and
subsequently flows. Social science methods can then determine the value of these lost services to assess compensation
to injured communities.
Assessing costs of restoration provides even more opportunities for ES research, requiring knowledge of how well
and how quickly different kinds of physical
restoration (eg water-blasting petroleum off of
rocks versus the use of chemical dispersants)
promote recovery of ES and whether there are
trade-offs among restoration choices regarding
how well, how quickly, and in what order services return (Palmer and Filoso 2009). Social
scientists can then provide assessments of how
services will be distributed to communities,
community preferences, and how to value the
trade-offs in services lost and gained (eg recreational fishing opportunities/revenue versus
commercial oyster harvest opportunities/revenue versus subsistence fishing opportunities;
du Bray et al. 2019).

economic value of particular services, these findings are
largely irrelevant because PES payments are based instead
on individuals’ opportunity costs (eg making it worth the
landowners’ efforts to restore and conserve the wetlands
rather than put their land to other productive uses).
Very few PES programs pay for performance –that is, for the
actual provision of services –because measurement and monitoring costs are often too high or too inaccurate to be practical.
Instead, payments are based on land management practices that
modeling predicts will result in the desired change in (or preservation of) service flow (Salzman et al. 2018). These models must
be robust enough to ensure that specific changes in land management (eg installing riparian buffers or swales) will improve a
specific outcome (eg flood resilience) by a specific amount.
Social science research can improve not only the understanding
of local land manager behavior and the appropriate level of
incentives to alter practices (Allred and Gary 2019), but also how
to build risk associated with dynamic biophysical and social
conditions into payment design.

Persuasion
Impact assessments, resource management plans, and urban
land-use plans must project future changes in service flows
under different scenarios (Armatas et al. 2018). For example,
an urban green infrastructure plan may contemplate different
mixes, quantities, and locations of green infrastructure components (wetlands, forests, meadows, swales, green roofs)
providing different suites of ES to various populations (Lovell

Payments
PES programs reward landowners, such as
upper watershed landowners who are compensated for maintaining or enhancing provision
of ES related to water filtration and soil stability
(Figure 3; Salzman et al. 2018). Officials implementing PES must determine how much to
pay, what to pay for, and how to ensure compliance –each of which raises unique research
questions. Despite a vast literature on the


Figure 3. A “payment for ecosystem services” (PES) program would pay landowners in this
forested upper watershed –located in the Blue Ridge Mountains in western North Carolina
(elevation approximately 1006 m or 3300 feet) –to avoid land-use practices that impair
flows of ES, such as water filtration and soil stability. Research linking specific land-use
practices to incremental reductions in ES flow will assist in the design of payment
incentives.
Front Ecol Environ doi:10.1002/fee.2390
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and Taylor 2013; Richards and Thompson 2019). Science supporting such “service-shed” level planning should be able to
identify and analyze the differential levels of ES distributed
across the service-shed, as well as trade-offs between scenarios
and among groups of beneficiaries (Kremer et al. 2016). Unlike
measuring aggregate service provision, this information alerts
policy actors to the risk of environmental justice concerns
(eg a wealthy upstream community may benefit from a development while a poor downstream community must now
improve its drinking water treatment because of a reduction
in the wetland service of water purification; Mandle et al.
2015). Identifying impacted parties under each scenario allows
policy actors to educate individuals and communities about
the benefits they receive from ecosystems and alert them to
critical changes. Once assessment or planning is complete,
these impacts can be addressed in the permitting process,
accounted for in a compensation program or liability scheme,
or mitigated to ensure equity.

Conclusions
ES research has traditionally focused on biophysical production and monetary valuation –where ES derive from and
how much they are worth. This has greatly advanced the
ES framework in high-
level policy pronouncements, and
continued research of this kind remains valuable. However,
as we have demonstrated, field-level conservation of ES has
lagged behind. It poses different questions, including who
benefits (and who loses) from particular decisions and by
how much. These cannot be answered by the science that
drove adoption of high-level policies. To reinforce the practical conservation of ES, scientists and policy actors must
collaborate to identify the specific research needs demanded
by specific policy instruments. A greater understanding of
the environmental policy toolkit will help scientists engage
in this collaboration.
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